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in international relations as in household economy, ‘cheapest’ can be 
most expensive. British Imperial policy in the nineteenth century was 
consistently dominated by an emphasis on austerity. The consequences were 
not infrequently heavy impositions on the British taxpayer when the paucity 
of resources employed by the Imperial government in pursuit of great 
purposes led to catastrophes. The locale was usually southern Africa. 
There the contrast between available means and avowed ends was tremendous. 
Economy measures contributed to a succession of Kaffir Wars each more 
expensive than its predecessor, culminating in the war of 1850-3 which cost 
the Imperial government hundreds of thousands of pounds and produced a 
revulsion in Parliament against further responsibility for those ‘barbarous 
and sanguinary wretches’, the African tribes on the frontier.1 The resultant 
withdrawal from the Orange River Territory and the Transvaal would have 
been economical had it not subsequently collided with the development of 
British interests and ambitions in the interior of southern and central Africa; 
the return of the Imperial factor to the area from which it had receded cost 
thousands of lives and millions of pounds.
This conflict between British pretensions and the means which Parliament 
was willing to provide was fundamental to the revival of the chartered 
company as an agency of expansion. When the ‘scramble for Africa’ 
began, British statesmen sought to meet the competition of Germany and 
France with minimum cost to the Treasury and minimum governmental 
responsibility. Private initiative, as manifested by Alfred Dent, Goldie, 
Mackinnon and Rhodes, seemed to offer the attractive prospect of accom­
plishing both ends. With the first three, the assumptions were vindicated 
to a considerable degree; in the case of Rhodes they were soon demonstrated 
to be bankrupt.
The early British South Africa Company has been described with a variety 
of epithets of greater or less validity. It has been called a ‘colossal stroke of 
thievery’,2 ‘a stock-exchange swindle’,3 ‘the African bubble’4; the un­
complimentary names are legion. One metaphor was not used which was 
perhaps most appropriate of all; it was an engine without brakes or governor. 
It was well designed for offensive action but it had no controls which could 
help to prevent a major collision. Much analysis has been devoted to the
1 J. S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, Berkeley ,Univ. of California Press, 1963, p. 249.
2 F. Ashton, ‘Mr. Rhodes as Capitalist Conspirator’, Progressive Review, 2 ,7.iv.l897, 58.
3 Truth, 31 .viii. 1893.
4 Daily Chronicle, 31.x.1893.
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causation of the Jameson Raid and the degree of culpability of Rhodes and 
and of Chamberlain. But the nature of the mechanism which was created in 
1888-9 was such that a debacle was highly likely, for the British South Africa 
Company was characterized from its origins by institutionalized irresponsi­
bility. The third Earl Grey, whose nephew Albert had asked him for advice 
about joining the projected chartered company, analysed the dangers of the 
company with the acuteness which characterized his long life as an observer 
of Imperial policy. The creation of such a powerful private association, he 
said, would have been unnecessary had the government earlier adopted a 
policy of firmly establishing its authority in areas where it desired to exert 
influence. But the African peoples of Matabeleland and Mashonaland were 
exposed to ‘urgent and very serious dangers’ from a flood of adventurers 
seeking another Rand in their territories, and a single authority with defined 
powers could be a means of avoiding the worst excesses provided that it was 
kept under control by the Imperial government.5 That control was rarely 
exercised and it was in the nature of Imperial policy that it not be.
In the 1880s and 1890s concern for the welfare of the Africans was an article 
of faith for the British government, but like other articles of faith which had 
become conventional it had lost its energy and force. The preoccupation of 
the Foreign and Colonial Offices in 1888-9 was not with Africans but with 
the control of the resources of the lands beyond the Zambezi; such control, 
of course, should be established with due regard for the principles of English 
justice. The founders of the British South Africa Company had the requisite 
financial power and avowed a commitment to keep out ‘unscrupulous 
adventurers’ from its area of jurisdiction.
The Company represented an amalgamation of two rival groups each of 
which had the capacity to frustrate the objects of the other. In England, a 
syndicate headed by Lord Gifford and George Cawston, backed by such men 
of substance as Baron Nathan Rothschild, had sought the blessing of the 
Colonial Office for a charter, and its overtures had been received with favour. 
In South Africa, Rhodes had achieved similar influence with the local 
Imperial authorities, and by the coup of the Rudd Concession in October 
1888 had strengthened his position against his London-based rivals whose 
agent Edward Maund had lost the race. The London group was blocked 
by Rhodes, but they could also bar his way by their influence in Britain. 
The sensible answer to the stalemate was the amalgamation which followed.
The board of directors reflected the antecedents of the Company. It 
included Gifford and Cawston and Rhodes and Beit, with Rochfort Maguire 
as Rhodes’s alternate. In addition, at the behest of the government, three 
members of the aristocracy were added to represent the public interest: 
the Duke of Abercorn, a friend of Lord Salisbury, the Duke of Fife, son-in- 
law of the Prince of Wales; and Albert Grey. Most of the board showed 
little interest in the operation of the Company beyond its effects on their
5 Durham University, Dept, of Palaeography, Grey Papers, 190/8, ‘Remarks on proposed 
grant of a Charter to amalgamated South Africa Company’, ll.vii.1889.
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personal fortunes. In London Cawston and Grey were active directors, 
Cawston in the financial area and Grey as liaison with government. But 
from the beginning authority was confided in Rhodes to make decisions 
committing the Company in Africa with virtually no restriction from the 
home board. Rhodes essentially had the scope to exercise his judgment 
without restraint short of large levies on the Company’s assets or serious 
embarrassment to the Imperial government. Grey was not greatly overstating 
when he credited Rhodes with ‘doing everything — supplying the foresight, 
the executive ability and the funds to make the Charter a success.’6 The 
results, given Rhodes’ temperament and megalomania, were predictable. 
His collisions with the Portuguese foreshadowed the antecedents of the 
Jameson Raid, the important difference being Lord Salisbury’s intervention 
in the Portuguese dispute for reasons of high policy before a major confront­
ation occurred.
Rhodes’ position vis-a-vis his directors was not unlike that of some power­
ful Imperial governors in their relationships with the home government. 
There were, however, important differences which made him even more 
of an irresponsible force. No governor had at his disposal a large personal 
fortune to be used at his discretion or could draw as Rhodes did on the 
resources of the De Beers diamond syndicate. As Prime Minister of Cape 
Colony between 1890 and the Raid he was also able to support his personal 
ambitions on behalf of the South Africa Company. And no governor 
compounded his irresponsibility by confiding plenary authority on a sub­
ordinate as did Rhodes with Leander Starr Jameson.
Rhodes reposed utmost confidence in Jameson. At the time of Jameson’s 
negotiations with Lobengula in 1890 over the right of the Pioneers to enter 
Mashonaland, Rhodes remarked that, ‘Jameson never makes a mistake.’7 
Rhodes was guilty of misjudgments of other subordinates but none with the 
consequences of his misplaced faith in Jameson.
The fault was not Jameson’s in the sense that he wilfully deviated from 
Rhodes’s intentions. On the contrary, Jameson was devoted to the execution 
of Rhodes’s objects as he understood them. Rhodes gave him great discret­
ionary authority; they discussed plans in occasional visits and through 
telegraphic communication, but it was left to Jameson to use his judgment 
in carrying out the details. As Rhodes said to Jameson in one of these 
telegraphic interchanges, ‘Your business is to administer the country as to 
which I have nothing to do but merely say “yes” if you take the trouble to 
ask me.’8
6 Hist. Mss. Collect., GR1 1/1 Grey Papers, Correspondence and Other Papers, 
General, 26.iii.1894-20.vi.1919, Scrap in Grey’s hand, quoted in G. Sims, Paladin o f 
Empire: Earl Grey and Rhodesia, Salisbury, Central Africa Historical Association, 1970, 
Local Series Pamphlet No. 26, p. 10.
7 T. Fuller, Cecil John Rhodes, London, Longmans Green, 1910, p. 75.
8 A 1/3/10, Administrator’s Office, In Letters, L. S. Jameson, Demi Official Letters 
received by C. J. Rhodes, 16.ii.1892-22.viii.1892, memo, of conversation held 15.V.1892; 
these telegraphic conversations were usually held on Sundays when the lines were not 
occupied with other business.
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In his administration of Mashonaland, Jameson acted within the broad 
guidelines of rapid development of the revenues of the territory and avoidance 
of native troubles which would disrupt that development. He, like Rhodes, 
expected that there would be an eventual war with the Matabele but hoped 
to postpone it until the white population was strong enough to make the 
outcome quick and certain. Though they speculated about the possible 
peaceful absorption of the Matabele into the labour supply for the mines 
and the white farms, they recognized that this transformation of the Matabele 
was unlikely until their military power had been broken. Rhodes and 
Jameson, however, wanted to select the time. Rutherfoord Harris reflected 
something of the Rhodes-Jameson line when he wrote to Johan Colenbrander: 
mentally when they [the Matabele] knocked me in the eye the 2nd day
I was there I made the same resolution as no doubt you did, that when the 
bell really rang for their disappearance from the stage, that I wd. be there 
to help them leave — but that day is still 2 years at least distant — possibly 
it will never come or they may accommodate themselves to their environ­
ment as the Swazies have . .  .9
Whether or not Jameson believed that he had an agreement with Lobengula 
that the Matabele would not raid into Mashonaland, he was prepared to 
capitalize on the attack of the impis in the vicinity of Fort Victoria to crush 
the Matabele power. His actions after his ultimatum to the impis to retire 
were those of a man bent on war; his conjuring up of phantom impis 
threatening the white population was clearly designed to justify military 
action to the imperial authorities.10 In making the decision to break the 
Matabele Jameson acted without specific instructions from Rhodes, trusting 
to his vindication after the fact.11 The easy triumph over the Matabele 
demonstrated Jameson’s perspicacity and he basked in the approval of the 
settler population and in that of Rhodes. In September 1893 Rhodes had 
expressed the view that ‘I would much rather it had been postponed for a 
year, but as Lobengula has brought it to a head and not me, I consider 
Dr. Jameson has acted quite rightly in every step he has taken.’12 When 
the Matabele were routed and Lobengula was in flight, endorsement was 
succeeded by unqualified praise. Jameson had by his initiative rid the 
Company of an incubus and opened the way for the economic development 
of Matabeleland. The experience of 1893 had fateful consequences two 
years later.
In his land policy Jameson also acted with considerable independence 
within certain broad guidelines. Both the general policy and his execution 
of it deeply affected the future of Rhodesia. The financial position of the 
Company in its early years was precarious, its liquid assets were exhausted
9 Hist. Mss. Collect., C04 1/1, J. W. Colenbrander Papers, Correspondence and Other 
Papers, General, 17.xiii.l883-4.x.l917, 9.ii.l892.
10LO 5/2/30, London Office, In Letters, Cape Town (Kimberley), 27.ix.-25.x.l893 
Jameson to High Commissioner to Jameson, 2.X.1893; other correspondence in this file 
supports this assertion.
II S. Glass, The Matabele War, London, Longmans, 1968, pp. 103-5.
12LO 5/2/28, London Office, In Letters, Cape Town (Kimberley), 3.vii.-9.viii. 1893, 
R. Harris to London Office, 9.viii.l893.
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by the costs of administration and the multitudinous expenses involved in 
the opening up of a new country. Without Rhodes’s pledges of his personal 
fortune, the condition would have been desperate indeed. The assets which 
could transform the situation from near bankruptcy to prosperity were gold 
and land. The first was prospective; the hope of rich gold discoveries 
buoyed up shares and attracted syndicates to Mashonaland:
The most important single element which determined the nature of econom­
ic and political development in Southern Rhodesia, has been the over­
estimation at the end of the 19th century of its mineral resources on the 
part of the British South Africa Company and the persistence of such an 
overestimation for roughly 15 years.13
Given the limitations in funds the only practicable policy for the founders 
of the Company to absorb rivals or to reward supporters seemed to be the 
allotment of shares or the assignment of mining claims or land grants. When 
Eduard A. Lippert in 1891 succeeded in delivering a concession from Lo- 
bengula of the right to alienate land he received in compensation not only 
30 000 shares of Chartered Stock but 75 square miles in Matabeleland and 
50 square miles in Mashonaland. These land rights he and his associates 
in turn sold to a syndicate which hoped to profit by the re-sale of the land 
to settlers.14 *Land was lavishly used as compensation to the Pioneers of 
1890, to the volunteers in the Matabele War, to favoured individuals and to 
syndicates which indicated that they were prepared to invest their capital in 
the development of Rhodesia. The land rights of Pioneers and volunteers 
were not for the most part used by their initial recipients for the cultivation 
of their estates; on the contrary, most of them fell into the hands of specula­
tors. Land rights like gold claims and shares, became a paper asset to be 
bought and sold rather than a precious resource to be assigned with safe­
guards that it would be used for developments. This practice in the early 
years of the Company was regarded as scandalous by the administrators who 
came into office after Rhodes and Jameson were swept out of control in the 
aftermath of the Jameson Raid. William Milton who was sent to Mashona­
land in 1896 to try to establish an efficient administration wrote that ‘the 
country has been very nearly ruined by the Honourable and military elements 
which are rampant everywhere.’16 One of the most notable of those to whom 
Milton referred was Sir John Willoughby whose deeds of valour on behalf 
of the Company had been handsomely rewarded. In addition to mining 
claims Willoughby had been assigned 600 000 acres of Mashonaland on the 
condition that he raise £50 000 capital for the development of his land.16 But 
there was no disposition to force Willoughby and others to comply with the 
terms of their contracts. Officials shied away from the ugly word ‘forfeiture’,
13 G. Arrighi, The Political Economy o f Rhodesia, The Hague, Mouton, 1967, p. 19.
14 A 1 /13/1 Administrator’s Office, In Letters, Rennie-Tailyour Concession, 4.1895-21.
xii.1896 Secretary Matabeleland and Mashonaland Syndicate to B.S.A.C., 4.iii. 1895.
16 Hist. Mss. Collec., MI 1/1/1 [Milton Papers, Correspondence and Other Papers, 
Official, c. 1896-8.V.1930], Milton to wife, 18.ix.1896.
16LO 3/1/13, London Office, Out Letters, Administrative and Commercial, 7.iv.-26. 
v.1893 London Office to Cape Town, 14.iv.1893.
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as the already doubtful future of Rhodesia would be further compromised 
by such severe measures.17
The London board in 1893, before the Matabele War, expressed its con­
cern to Rhodes about the lavish manner in which land was being assigned. 
They cited among others the following examples:18 
Northern Territories Exploring 300 square miles north of Zambezi, 
Company Ltd. 6 000 acres coal grant north or south of
Zambezi.
100 000 acres Mashonaland.Copenhagen (Mashonaland) 
Company Ltd.
Chartered Gold Fields Ltd.
J. W. Dor6
100 square miles north of the Zambezi, 
6 000 acres coal grant north or south of 
Zambezi, 200000 acres Mashonaland. 
30 000 morgen (c. 60 000 acres) north 
of Zambezi.
30 000 acres.
75 square miles Mashonaland.
10 000 square miles north of Zambezi.
Mashonaland Agency Ltd.
Moore’s Rhodesia Concession
North Charterland Exploration 
Company Ltd.
The Board’s complaint reflected the fact that it had not been an active 
factor in land policy and that the actual decisions had been made in South 
Africa. Milton placed the entire blame on Jameson who, he said, had ‘given 
nearly the whole country to the Willoughby’s, White’s and others of that 
class so that there is absolutely no land left of any value for the settlement 
of Immigrants by the Government.’ Jameson, he suggested, ‘must have been 
off his head for some time before the Raid. The worst is that Rhodes will
not clear himself at Jameson’s expense.’19
Rhodes as Milton portrayed him was a noble leader who refused to censure 
an erring subordinate. But Jameson was carrying out land policy in accord­
ance with what he thought were Rhodes’s wishes. Rhodes frequently in­
structed Jameson to make lavish land grants and occasionally Jameson was 
moved to express a mild caveat about giving away so much of the arable and 
pastoral land of the high veld to individuals who could not develop it 
effectively.20
Jameson’s fault was not that he violated what he thought were the intentions 
of Rhodes but that he was an incompetent administrator. When he was 
removed from office, his successors found appalling acts of misfeasance 
during his tenure. The Surveyor-General, Duncan, for example, had been 
awarded, allegedly with Jameson’s sanction, 1 000 square miles for relinquish­
ment of his private practice. This same surveyor had left the land-descriptions 
in a shambles.21 As H. Wilson Fox of the London Office wrote to Milton:
17 A 1/5/1, [Administrator’s Office, In Letters, London Board, Demi Official, 
ll.ii.-17.xii.1898], Memorandum ‘Beneficial Occupation of Land’, n.d. [1898].
18 LO 3/1/28, London Office, Out Letters, Administrative and Commercial, 
27.iv.-8.vi.1893 London Office to Cape Town, 25.V.1893.
19 MI 1/1/1, Milton to wife, 18.ix.1896.
20 LO 5/2/17, London Office, In Letters, Cape Town (Kimberley), 10.ii.-16.iii.1892 
Jameson to Rhodes, telegrams 10 and 12 iii.1892.
21 Correspondence on this subject is in L 1/1/1, Land Settlement Department, 
Out Letters, Confidential, 8.v.l897-30.xii.l902.
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‘More of the Augean stable of the past to sweep up I suppose you will say. It 
certainly is hard that the cleaning of all the dirty corners left by Jameson 
should fall on your shoulders.’22
The evidence is impressive that Jameson was a poof administrator. 
Furthermore, neither he nor Rhodes had any concern for the safeguarding 
of the land rights of the Africans. A few years later, Rhodes wrote to Milton 
that he had noticed that the total African population of Matabeleland and 
Mashonaland was nearly 500 000 and that they cultivated 600 000 acres. 
This, he thought, was almost incredible. ‘It seems such an enormous extent 
of land for the number of people, representing over an acre a head, including 
men, women, and children.’23 This acreage for a half million Africans was of 
the same extent as that granted to Sir John Willoughby’s syndicate, although 
neither Rhodes nor Jameson would have seen the comparison as relevant. 
They were preoccupied with the development of the resources of the country, 
and their policy, however loosely it was carried out, was to seek to attract 
capital and settlers by oifering attractive terms.
For the disasters of the 1890s associated with the Chartered Company it 
is easy to assign culpability to Rhodes and to Jameson. Their actions 
obviously were central. But others by their inaction also contributed. The 
charter provided for various controls which were never exercised and re­
strictions which were never enforced. The Colonial Office did not oversee 
the operations of the Company. Lord Olivier, who as a young official 
observed these early years, wrote later that the Colonial Office ‘looked on 
hypnotized by the aura of impeccable personages whose figures decked the 
Company’s office-window . .  .That Office, indeed, had no more control over 
the Chartered Company than the League of Nations has now over a mandated 
Power (the relations are closely parallel) and had far too much delicacy to 
act in any manner that might have been rebuffed as inquisitorial. Short of 
revoking the charter, it could do nothing.’24
The London directors also were derelict. With the exception of Earl Grey, 
the ‘public’ members of the board showed only a languid interest in any 
aspects of the Company’s business other than the effect of the fluctuations of 
its shares on their personal fortunes. They translated their indifference into 
a policy of complete confidence in their dynamic Managing Director. Perhaps 
given the distance from which they sat, they could not have been effective in 
any event, but the indictment stands that they did not try. After the Jameson 
Raid, the Duke of Fife resigned from the Board and delivered a bitter attack 
on Rhodes and Jameson for having planned the invasion without the know­
ledge of the directors.25 But Fife and others had sat on the Board for years
22 A 1/5/1, Fox to Milton, 14.X.1898.
23 MI 1/1, Rhodes to Milton, 5.xii.l901.
24 S. Olivier, The Anatomy o f African Misery, London, Hogarth Press, 1927, p. 51 and 
note.
25 The Times, 31.iii.1898.
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without protest against Rhodes’ independence of action. Rhodes was a 
power without effective controls, Jameson was a loyal subordinate who 
thought he knew Rhodes’s mind and acted accordingly. This combination 
was highly dangerous; how dangerous was amply demonstrated in December, 
1895.
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